13th Juror, LLC

The "Cardinal Principle of Police Use of Force restraint" is that "if it is not necessary to use more force, it is necessary not to use more force."

Before a police officer performs a lawful seizure, he/she must know and rely upon the law. Each Liability law disc contains the full case review of more then 5,200 Police Procedures and Practices cases (Updated to August 1, 2010) from the United States Federal & State Court Systems. The United States Supreme Court, Federal Courts, and State Courts are represented. Link to "Coplaw CD" in the left column to purchase your disc. (13thjuror Brochure)

In determining whether expert testimony on the use of force by a police officer is properly admissible under the appropriate standard, we note that "[a]s a general proposition, the 'objective reasonableness' standard may be comprehensible to a lay juror. On the other hand, any 'objective' test implies the existence of a standard of conduct, and, where the standard is not defined by the generic--a reasonable person--but rather by the specific--a reasonable officer--it is more likely that [federal rule of evidence] 702's line between common and specialized knowledge has been crossed."Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 378 (4th Cir. 1993) (analyzing plaintiff's claim that court improperly excluded expert testimony concerning defendant's use of non-deadlyforce in effecting arrest). In Kopf, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that "[w]here force is reduced to its most primitive form--the bare hands--expert testimony might not be helpful. Add handcuffs, a gun, a slapjack, [M]ace, or some other tool, and the jury may start to ask itself: What is [M]ace? What is an officer's training on using a gun? How much damage can a slapjack do? Answering these questions may often be assisted by expert testimony." State v. Smith, 73 Conn.App. 173, 807 A.2d 500 (Conn.App. 10/22/2002)...We conclude that the test for evaluating self-defense claims pursuant to CGS ' 53a-22 is a subjective-objective test.

To be reasonably probable, a conclusion must be more likely than not. State v. Nunes, 800 A.2d 1160, 1175-76 (Conn. 2002). In other words, the opinion must be “probable” rather than merely “possible”. State v. Weinberg, 575 A.2d 1003 (Conn.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990).... expert testimony regarding causation based upon possibility or speculation is insufficient.... testimony that a certain thing is possible is no evidence at all...opinion as to what is possible is no more valid than the jury’s own speculations as to what is or is not possible.”

A belief is "objectively reasonable" if "a reasonable person" in the defendant's position could have believed his/her perceptions from his/her at-scene perspective, given the particular subjective as well as objective factual circumstances.

"More likely than not" is a "preponderance of evidence" guilt standard where 51% of the facts and circumstances are believed to be 'true'.

A 'reasonable suspicion' is a "belief that is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time and place the peace officer acts"

The Criminal guilt standard is 'beyond a reasonable doubt' which is greater than the 'more likely than not' civil guilt standard but short of guilt beyond all doubt.

34 years of Police Experience.
Masters Degree in Criminal Justice.
Police Detective, Sergeant, Lieutenant

 Connecticut Police Academy Training Instructor (Ret)

 Connecticut Police Academy Worker's Compensation Stipulation 

Reginald F. , Jr.

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Expert Witness CV

 

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