Training is the 13th Juror™
What is the definition of
Probable Cause?
Ham v. Greene, 248 Conn.
508, 729 A.2d 740 (Conn. 05/04/1999)
"An arresting officer is
entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages on a
claim for arrest without probable cause if either (a) it was
objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable
cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could
disagree on whether the probable cause test was met."
Lee v.
Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). Thus, "[t]he issue
for immunity purposes is not probable cause in fact but `arguable'
probable
cause." Id., quoting
Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1455 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 828, 108 S. Ct. 97, 98 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1987).
SZEKERES v. SCHAEFFER,
3:01cv2099(MRK), 3:01cv2108(MRK) (D.Conn. 03/26/2004)
Even if probable cause to
arrest is ultimately found not to have existed, an arresting
officer would still be entitled to qualified immunity from suit
for damages if he can establish that there was "arguable
probable
cause" to arrest.
Escalera, 2004 WL 534476, at *4. "Arguable
probable
cause exists `if either
(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe
that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable
competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was
met." Id. (quoting Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864,
870 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Caldarola, 298 F.3d at 162 ("In
situations where an officer may have reasonably but mistakenly
concluded that probable cause existed, the officer is
nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity."). As the Second
Circuit has explained, "[T]he analytically distinct test for
qualified immunity is more favorable to the officers than the
one for probable cause; "arguable
probable
cause" will suffice to
confer qualified immunity for the arrest." Page 11 Escalera,
2004 WL 534476, at *4.
"Officers can have
reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts establishing
the existence of probable cause . . . and in those situations
courts will not hold that they have violated the Constitution."
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001); see also Caldarola,
298 F.3d at 162. Therefore, "in situations where an officer may
have reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable cause
existed, the officer is nonetheless entitled to qualified
immunity." Id.; see also Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 423 (2d
Cir. 1995). "If police officers of reasonable competence could
disagree as to whether there was probable cause, there is `arguable
probable
cause' sufficient to
warrant qualified immunity for the defendant officers." Boyd v.
New York, 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003).
Fonseca v. Alterio, No.
3:03CV1055 (D. Conn. 07/24/2006)
"The right not to be arrested
without probable cause is a clearly established right." Lee v.
Sandberg, 136 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). Even if a police
officer violates this right, however, the officer will still be
entitled to qualified immunity if he has
arguable
probable
cause, in that his
"actions were not objectively unreasonable at the time they were
taken." Id. at 102. "Arguable
probable
cause exists when a
reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and
possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could
have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the
light of well established law." Id. at 102
Brown v. Aybar, 451
F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Conn. 09/07/2006)
Claims for false arrest and
malicious prosecution under Section 1983 are governed by state
law. See Grimm v. Krupinsky, No. 04-2913-CV, 2005 WL 1586978 (2d
Cir. July 7, 2005) (citing Davis v. Rodriquez, 364 F.3d 424, 433
(2d Cir. 2004)). Under Connecticut law, an absence of probable
cause is an essential element of both claims. See id. (citing
Davis, 364 F.3d at 433, and McHale v. W.B.S. Corp., 187 Conn.
444, 447 (Conn. 1982)). "Probable cause to arrest exists when
the arresting officer has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy
information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to
warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the
person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime."
Escalara v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) Further, even
if actual probable cause is not found to have existed, an
arresting officer will be entitled to qualified immunity if
there was "arguable
probable
cause" for the arrest.
Id. The Second Circuit has defined "arguable
probable
cause" as follows:
Arguable
probable
cause exists if either
(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe
that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable
competence would disagree on whether the probable cause test was
met.
"'The quantum of evidence
required to establish probable cause to arrest need not reach
the level of evidence necessary to support a conviction.'" Cohen
v. Dubuc, No. 99cv2566 (EBB), 2000 WL 1838351, at *4 (D. Conn.
Nov. 28, 2000) (citing United States v. Fisher, 702 F.2d 372,
371 (2d Cir. 1989)). It is well established that when
information "sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the
person to be arrested" is received from a putative victim or
eyewitness, probable cause exists absent circumstances that
raise doubts as to the individual's veracity. See Curley v.
Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001); Martinez v. Simonetti,
202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000); Singer v. Fulton County
Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-34 (1983) ("[I]f an unquestionably
honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity
-- which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability
-- we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge
unnecessary."). Indeed, "probable cause can exist even where it
is based on mistaken information, so long as the arresting
officer acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on that
information." Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.
1994).
As noted above, an arresting
officer will be entitled to qualified immunity if there was "arguable
probable
cause" for an arrest,
defined to exist when: "(a) it was objectively reasonable for
the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b)
officers of reasonable competence would disagree on whether the
probable cause test was met." Escalara v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737,
743 (2d Cir. 2004). Reading the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude based on
this record that it was objectively reasonable for defendants to
believe that probable cause existed, or that reasonable officers
would disagree on whether there was probable cause to arrest
plaintiff for the claimed violations where another individual
admitted guilt, which admission plaintiff corroborated, and
given that defendants knew plaintiff had not been working at the
School around the time of the incident and had been told by
plaintiff that he had no supervisory responsibilities at the
School.
Bloom v. Town of
Stratford, No. 3:05cv217 (D. Conn. 11/16/2006)
Even if a police officer
lacks probable cause to arrest, however, he is entitled to
qualified immunity from a § 1983 suit for damages if there is "arguable
probable
cause" to arrest, i.e.,
if it was reasonable to believe that there was probable cause or
if officers of reasonable competence could disagree as to the
existence of probable cause. Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743
(2d Cir. 2004). According to Escalera, "the analytically
distinct test for qualified immunity is more favorable to the
officers than the one for probable cause; 'arguable
probable
cause' will suffice to
confer qualified immunity for the arrest." Id. For the same
reasons as those set forth above, however, the Court finds that
there remains a question of fact whether Mullane had probable
cause, or even "arguable
probable
cause," to arrest
Plaintiff. A jury is entitled to examine the facts and weigh the
evidence to determine whether probable cause or
arguable
probable
cause was present when
Plaintiff was arrested.
Justin F. v. Maloney,
No. 3:04CV1149 (D. Conn. 03/07/2007)
The Second
Circuit has held that to state a claim of false arrest under
Connecticut law--and, therefore, to state a § 1983 claim for
false arrest--a plaintiff must prove that the prosecution on the
arrest terminated in the plaintiff's favor. "A person who thinks
there is not even probable cause to believe he committed the
crime with which he is charged must pursue the criminal case to
an acquittal or an unqualified dismissal, or else waive his
section 1983 claim." Roesch v. Otarola, 980 F.2d 850, 853 (2d
Cir. 1992); see Torres v. Howell, No. 3:03CV2227 (MRK)(WIG),
2006 WL 1525942, at *5-*6 (D. Conn. May 30, 2006) (observing
that courts have questioned Roesch's statement of Connecticut
false arrest law, but nevertheless following Roesch).*fn3
Similarly, "[t]o prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution, a
plaintiff must prove that . . . 'the criminal proceedings have
terminated'" in his favor. Heussner v. Day, Berry & Howard, LLP,
94 Conn. App. 569, 577 (App. Ct. 2006) (quoting McHale, 187
Conn. at 447).
Plaintiffs may satisfy the
favorable termination element by showing that the charges
against Justin were "'discharged without a trial under
circumstances amounting to the abandonment of the prosecution
without request by him or arrangement with him.'" White v. Wortz,
66 F. Supp. 2d 331, 334 (D. Conn. 1999) (quoting See v. Gosselin,
133 Conn. 158, 160 (1946)); see also Russo v. City of Hartford,
184 F. Supp. 2d 169, 186 (D. Conn. 2002) ("[S]o long as the
prior action terminated without any adjudication against, or
settlement requiring consideration from, the . . . plaintiff,
the Connecticut Supreme Court deems the termination prong
satisfied."). A nolle prosequi, such as that entered in this
case, can constitute a favorable termination, so long as the
plaintiff demonstrates that it was entered under circumstances
indicating that the State has abandoned the prosecution without
request by the plaintiff or arrangement with him. See Holman v.
Cascio, 390 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123 (D. Conn. 2005) ("[A] nolle of
the criminal charge may still permit the plaintiff to satisfy
[the element of a favorable termination] if the circumstances of
the nolle satisfy the See v. Gosselin test of 'an abandonment of
the prosecution without request from or by an arrangement with
[the defendant].'").*fn4
"The existence of probable
cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete
defense to an action for false arrest, whether that action is
brought under state law or under § 1983." Jenkins v. City of
N.Y., No. 06-0182-CV, 2007 WL 415171, at *4 (2d Cir. Feb. 6,
2007)
"'[P]robable cause to arrest
exists when the officers have knowledge or reasonably
trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the
belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is
committing a crime.'" Jenkins, 2007 WL 415171, at *4 (quoting Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852) (alteration in original). Federal
courts evaluate probable cause in light of the totality of the
circumstances. Id. at *8. Likewise,
under Connecticut law,
probable cause "comprises such facts 'as would reasonably
persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect
or conjecture, but to believe' that criminal activity has
occurred." State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 548 (1991) (quoting
Stone v. Stevens, 12 Conn. 218, 230 (1837)); see also State v.
Heinz, 193 Conn. 612, 617 (1984) (defining probable cause as a
standard "less demanding than that which attends an inquiry into
whether there has been a prima facie showing of criminal
activity. Instead, all that is required is that the affidavit,
read in a common-sense manner, give objective evidence of a fair
probability that proscribed activity has occurred."
Arguable
probable
cause exists "if either
(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe
that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable
competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was
met." Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004)
GAGNE v. DEMARCO, 281
F.Supp.2d 390 (D. Conn. 08/26/2003)
The Second Circuit has held
that "in the context of a qualified immunity defense to an
allegation of false arrest, the defending officer need only show
`arguable'
probable
cause," Martinez v.
Simonetti. 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000), because "[t]he
concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that
reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on
particular police conduct." Saucier. 533 U.S. at 205.
"Officers
can have reasonable, but mistaken, beliefs as to the facts
establishing the existence of probable cause . . . and in those
situations courts will not hold that they have violated the
Constitution." Id. at 206. Therefore, in situations where an
officer may have reasonably but mistakenly concluded that
probable cause existed, the officer is entitled to qualified
immunity. See Lennon v. Miller. 66 F.3d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1995)
(`"[I]t is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in
some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable
cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those
officials . . . should not be held personally liable.'")
(quoting Anderson. 483 U.S. at 641); see Anderson. 483 U.S. at
641 ("The relevant question . . . is the objective (albeit
fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have
believed [the officer's conduct] to be lawful, in light of
clearly established law and the information the . . . officers
possessed."); see also Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority 124
F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 1997) ("A police officer is entitled to
qualified immunity shielding him or her from a claim of damages
for false arrest where (1) it is objectively reasonable for the
officer to believe there was probable cause to make the arrest,
or (2) reasonably competent police officers could disagree as to
whether there was probable cause to arrest."). [ Page 9]
The Court must look to the
"totality of the circumstances"
in deciding whether arguable
probable
cause exists to effect
an arrest. See Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 233 (1983);
Bernard v. United States. 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994). The
Court "must consider those facts available to the officer at the
time of the arrest and immediately before it." Lowth v. Town of
Cheektowaga. 82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996). "[P]robable cause
is a fluid concept-turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."
Gates. 462 U.S. at 232.
In determining whether
police officers had
probable cause to make an arrest, courts examine the
“totality of the circumstances.” Bernard v. United States,
25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994)
Probable cause to arrest exists
"when the authorities have knowledge or reasonably
trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been
committed by the person to be arrested." Golino v. City of New
Haven, 950 F.2d, 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991)
Probable Cause
requires “fair probability” under the “totality of
the circumstances” …Illinois v Gates 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983)...A finding of Probable Cause does not require “a prima
facie showing of criminal activity” or demonstration “that it is
more probable than not that a crime has been or is being
committed.” United States v Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 50 (2nd Cir.
1987)...[P]roof of probable cause requires less than proof
by a preponderance of the evidence." Proof by a
preponderance of evidence is assessed at the
51%
level of certainty. (State v. Eady 249 Conn. 439-40).
"We consistently have held that [t]he quantum of evidence
necessary to establish probable cause exceeds mere suspicion,
but is substantially less than that required for
conviction. . . . Reasonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause....…the line between
mere suspicion and probable cause "necessarily must be drawn by
an act of judgment formed in light of the particular situation
and with account taken of all the circumstances." State v. Marra,
222 Conn. 506, 513, 610 A.2d 1113 (1992); State v. Magnotti,
supra, 198 Conn. 213.
“Probable cause
is established when the arresting officer has knowledge or
reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a
person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has
been committed by the person to be arrested.” Singer, 63 F.3d at
119 However, an arresting officer’s “subjective reason for
making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which
the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck v. Alford,
543 U.S. 146, 153-55, 125 S.Ct. 588, 594 (2004) (rejecting “rule
that the offense establishing probable cause must be ‘closely
related’ to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense
identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest”). In
other words,
the
constitutionality of an arrest does not turn on an arresting
officer’s ability to identify correctly the class of offense for
which probable cause exists.
Probable Cause is
defined: “The quantum of evidence required lies somewhere
between bare suspicion and proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
and is usually said to require personal knowledge or reasonably
trustworthy information from others sufficient to warrant a man
of reasonable caution to reach these conclusions.” (Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). Probable cause a
higher standard than "reasonable suspicion". In State v.
Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 12/01/2000) probable cause
is defined as...probable cause
is no more than a
50% likelihood...
Reasonable minds may disagree as to whether a particular [set of
facts] establishes probable cause." State of Connecticut v.
Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 541, 628 A.2d 567 (1993).
...We have
said that a police officer "is not required to explore and
eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence
before making an arrest."...Martinez v. Simonetti,
202 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 02/04/2000)...
"Actions and things observed
by an experienced law enforcement officer might have more
significance to him in determining whether the law is being
violated at a given time and place than they would have to a
layman . . . ." State of Connecticut v. Dukes, supra, 209 Conn.
123; see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742-43, 103 S. Ct. 1535,
75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983). An officer's experience and
training…are to be taken into account such that, as the leading
treatise on search and seizure law puts it,
"a trained and experienced
officer will have probable cause in circumstances when the
layman would not." 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure §
3.2(c); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 501 (2d Cir.
1979) (circumstances surrounding a stop "`are to be viewed
through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on
the scene, guided by his experience and training'")
(quoting United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 61 (2d Cir.
1977)). We recently demonstrated the effect of this principle in
United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2001). Law
enforcement officials are trained to cull significance from
behavior that would appear
innocent to the untrained observer.’’ United States v.
Bailey, 417 F.3d 873, 877 (8th Cir. 2005); ("[A] police officer
views the facts through the lens of his police experience and
expertise. . . . [A] police officer may draw inferences
based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause
exists."; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 91 S.
Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971)...The
Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be
arrested. (Garcia v. Gasparri, No.
3:00cv1576 (JBA) (D. Conn. 03/12/2002).
The long-prevailing standard
of probable cause protects "citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,"
while giving "fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S.
160, 176 (1949). On many occasions, we have reiterated that the
probable-cause standard is a " `practical, non-technical
conception' " that deals with " `the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.' " Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S.
213, 231 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, supra, at 175-176); see,
e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 695 (1996);
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1989). "[P]robable
cause is a fluid concept -- turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts -- not readily, or
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Gates, 462
U. S., at 232. The probable-cause standard is
incapable
of precise definition or quantification into percentages
because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality
of the circumstances. See ibid.; Brinegar, 338 U. S., at 175. We
have stated, however, that "[t]he substance of all the
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief
of guilt," ibid. , and that the belief of guilt must be
particularized with respect to the person to be searched or
seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 91 (1979).
"As early as Locke v. United
States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 (1813), Chief Justice Marshall
observed, in a closely related context: `[T]he term "probable
cause," according to its usual acceptation, means less than
evidence which would justify condemnation ... . It imports a
seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.' More
recently, we said that `the quanta ... of proof ' appropriate in
ordinary judicial proceedings are inapplicable to the decision
to issue a warrant. Brinegar, 338 U. S., at 173. Finely tuned
standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a
preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials,
have no place in the [probable-cause] decision."
As the Supreme Court recently
reiterated, "an arresting officer's state of mind (except for
the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of
probable cause." Devenpeck v. Alford, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct.
588, 593 (2004)...Cohen v. Dubuc, No. 3:99-CV-2566 (D. Conn.
11/28/2000)...United States v. Fisher, 702 F.2d 372, 375 (2d
Cir. 1983). Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-244 n. 13
(1983)(stating that "[p]robable cause requires only a
probability or
substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity."). Thus, the fact that
the charges were later dismissed or an arrestee was subsequently
acquitted of the crime for which he was arrested does not
indicate that probable cause was lacking for the arrest. Krause
v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 371 (2d Cir. 1989)...In determining
whether the necessary quantum of evidence existed to support a
finding of probable cause, the court is required to evaluate the
totality of the circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. In making
this determination, a court "must consider those facts available
to the officer at the time of
arrest and immediately before it." Lowth v. Town of
Cheekowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996)...."The quantum of
evidence required to establish probable cause to arrest need not
reach the level of evidence necessary to support a conviction ."
The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes
justification and “is a complete defense to an action for false
arrest.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996).
State v. Barton, 219 Conn.
529, 548 (1991)(explaining that, under Connecticut law, probable
cause "comprises such facts as would reasonably persuade an
impartial and reasonable mind
not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that
criminal activity has occurred")
State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268,
255 Conn. 268, 764 A.2d 1251, 764 A.2d 1251 (Conn.
01/30/2001)..."We consistently
have held that [t]he quantum of evidence necessary to establish
probable cause exceeds
mere suspicion, but is substantially less than that required for
conviction. . . . The existence of probable cause does
not turn on whether the defendant could have been convicted on
the same available evidence. . . . [P]roof of probable
cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the
evidence." State v. Eady, supra, 249 Conn. 439-40; see
also State v. Trine, supra, 236 Conn. 237; State v. Munoz, 233
Conn. 106, 135-36, 659 A.2d 683 (1995). "Probable cause, broadly
defined, comprises such facts as would reasonably persuade an
impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or
conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred.
. . . The probable cause determination is, simply, an analysis
of probabilities... The determination is not a technical one,
but is informed by the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons], not
legal technicians, act. . . .
Probable cause is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules. . . . Reasonable minds may
disagree as to whether a particular [set of facts] establishes
probable cause." State v. Eady,
supra, 440, quoting State v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 541, 628 A.2d
567 (1993).
State v. Ledbetter, 881
A.2d 290, 275 Conn. 534 (Conn. 09/27/2005)...[a]s we
have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not
mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . ."we
invoke our supervisory authority to require trial courts, in
future trials, to incorporate a jury instruction informing
the jury of the risks inherent in certain eyewitness
identifications. We reiterate, however, that an
indication by the identification procedure administrator that a
suspect is present in the procedure is an unnecessarily
suggestive element of the process that should be considered by
the trial court in its analysis. We also agree that the trial
court, as part of its analysis, should consider whether the
identification procedure administrator instructed the witness
that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the procedure
and should take into account the results of the research studies
concerning that instruction.
AN ACT CONCERNING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION This is a
pending bill before the current Connecticut Legislative Body.
The Second Circuit has held
that "[a]n arresting officer advised of a crime by a person who
claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or
information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause
to effect an arrest absent circumstances that raise doubts as to
the victim's veracity." Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d
110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995). "[A] police officer may rely upon the
statements of victims and witnesses to determine the existence
of probable cause for the arrest, see Martinez v. Simonetti, 202
F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000), regardless of the ultimate
accurateness or truthfulness of the statements. See Bernard v.
United States, 25 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1994)." Hotaling v.
LaPlante, 167 F. Supp. 2d 517, 521 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); Miloslavsky
v. AES Eng'g Soc'y, 808 F. Supp. 351, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (" The
veracity of citizen complaints who are the victims of the very
crime they report to the police is assumed."), aff'd, 993 F.2d
1534 (2d Cir. 1993).
The fourth amendment to
the United States constitution provides: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." The fourth amendment to the
United States constitution is made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).
The constitution of
Connecticut, article first, § 7, provides: "The people
shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions
from unreasonable searches or seizures; and no
warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or things,
shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation."
The constitution of
Connecticut, article first, § 9, provides: "No person
shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly
warranted by law."
Commentary:
Let's synopsize the
percentages of culpability on an artificial scale from 0%-100%
to establish a reasonable belief in Guilt.
-
A consensual encounter
occurs from 0% to 17%
-
An Investigative Detention
( Terry Stop ) Encounter occurs from 17% - 38%
-
Probable Cause is
established at 38% - This is an act of judgment as opposed
to a finely delineated demarcation point.
-
Benefit of the Doubt is at
the 49% Level of Facts and Circumstances and provides for
the officer to use discretion in the exercise of an arrest
sanction versus some other non-arrest remedy.
-
Preponderance of Evidence
is established at 51%
-
Guilt beyond a Reasonable
Doubt is established at 87%
-
Substantial Certainty is
established at the 90% level
-
Absolute certainty occurs
at the 99% level
Police officers arrest
innocent suspects...but believe that the suspects are guilty.
America's court systems have acquitted the guilty and convicted
the innocent. Victims and witnesses provided the testimony that
was a believable lie which resulted in the incarceration and
deaths of the wrongly convicted. Reasonable belief is not
necessarily factual truth. Our courts only provide "fair"
justice" not "perfect" justice.
The reader is encouraged to
obtain legal advise from their respective agency's legal
counsel. This update does not represent legal advise.
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