Connecticut
General
Statutes
§53a-55
and
§53a-55a.
General
Statutes
§
53a-55
(a)
provides
in
relevant
part:
‘‘A
person
is
guilty
of
manslaughter
in
the
first
degree
when:
(1)
With
intent
to
cause
serious
physical
injury
to
another
person,
he
causes
the
death
of
such
person
or
of a
third
person
. .
.
.’’
General
Statutes
§
53a-55a
(a)
provides
in
relevant
part:
‘‘A
person
is
guilty
of
manslaughter
in
the
first
degree
with
a
firearm
when
he
commits
manslaughter
in
the
first
degree
as
provided
in
section
53a-55,
and
in
the
commission
of
such
offense
he
uses,
or
is
armed
with
and
threatens
the
use
of
or
displays
or
represents
by
his
words
or
conduct
that
he
possesses
a
pistol,
revolver,
shotgun,
machine
gun,
rifle
or
other
firearm.
. .
.
We
conclude
that
in
excluding
certain
evidence
at
trial,
the
court
deprived
the
defendant
of
his
right
to
present
a
defense.
First,
the
defendant
argues
that
the
state
failed
to
prove,
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt,
one
of
the
essential
elements
of
the
crime
of
manslaughter
in
the
first
degree
with
a
firearm.
Second,
the
defendant
argues
that
the
state
failed
to
disprove
his
theory
of
justification,
in
this
case,
self-defense
pursuant
to
General
Statutes
§
53a-22.
To
obtain
a
manslaughter
conviction
under
§§
53a-55
(a)
(1)
and
53a-55a,
the
state
must
prove
that
the
defendant,
(1)
with
the
intent
to
cause
serious
physical
injury
to
another
person,
(2)
caused
the
death
of
such
person
or a
third
person
(3)
using,
or
threatening
to
use
by
displaying
or
representing
by
his
words
or
conduct,
that
he
possesses
a
firearm.
‘‘The
intent
to
cause
serious
physical
injury
required
for
a
conviction
of
manslaughter
in
the
first
degree
under
§
53a-55
(a)
(1),
by
definition,
required
a
jury’s
finding
that
the
defendant
caused
a
physical
injury
which
creates
a
substantial
risk
of
death,
or
which
causes
serious
disfigurement,
serious
impairment
of
health
or
serious
loss
or
impairment
of
the
function
of a
bodily
organ.’’
The
defendant
concedes
that
‘‘[he]
caused
the
death
of
[the
victim]
and
that
he
did
so
by
use
of a
firearm.’’
The
defendant
does
dispute,
however,
his
mental
state
at
the
moment
he
fired
the
single
fatal
shot
into
the
victim’s
back.
‘‘A
person’s
intent
is
to
be
inferred
from
his
conduct
and
the
surrounding
circumstances
and
is
an
issue
for
the
[trier
of
fact]
to
decide.’’
State
v.
Nosik,
245
Conn.
196,
208,
715
A.2d
673,
cert.
denied,
525
U.S.
1020,
119
S.
Ct.
547,
142
L.
Ed.
455
(1998).
‘‘[A]
factfinder
may
infer
an
intent
to
cause
serious
physical
injury
from
circumstantial
evidence
such
as
the
type
of
weapon
used,
the
manner
in
which
it
was
used,
the
type
of
wound
inflicted
and
the
events
leading
up
to
and
immediately
following
the
incident.’’
State
v.
James,
supra,
54
Conn.
App.
31.
‘‘Because
direct
evidence
of
the
accused’s
state
of
mind
is
rarely
available,
intent
is
often
inferred
from
the
cumulative
effect
of
the
circumstantial
evidence
and
the
rational
inferences
drawn
therefrom.’’
State
v.
Sanders,
54
Conn.
App.
732,
738,
738
A.2d
674,
cert.
denied,
251
Conn.
913,
739
A.2d
1250
(1999),
citing
State
v.
Sivri,
231
Conn.
115,
126,
646
A.2d
169
(1994).
A
person’s
‘belief,’
like
‘intent,’
has
always
been
determined
by a
jury
by
listening
to
the
testimony
of
the
defendant
. .
.
and
by
evaluating
the
circumstances
surrounding
the
incident
as
presented
in
other
testimony
and
exhibits
and,
therefrom,
determine
what
his
belief
or
intent
was.
We
conclude
that
the
jury
reasonably
could
have
found
that
the
defendant
intended
to
cause
the
victim’s
death.
…we conclude that the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative
force
of
the
evidence
established
the
defendant’s
intent
to
cause
the
victim
serious
physical
injury
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt.
The
defendant,
citing
his
trial
testimony,
concedes
that
he
‘‘fired
the
shot
to
disable
[the
victim]
. .
.
.’’
He
further
concedes
that
‘‘it
is
certainly
possible,
and
maybe
even
probable,
that
the
defendant’s
‘conscious
objective’
was
to
[cause
a
serious
physical
injury].’’
Connecticut
case
law
clearly
permits
a
jury
to
infer
intent
based
solely
on
the
undisputed
facts
of
the
case,
let
alone
other
testimony
and
evidence
that
the
parties
dispute.
See
State
v.
Sanders,
supra,
54
Conn.
App.
739
(reasonable
to
infer
intent
to
cause
serious
physical
injury
to
person
where
defendant
fired
gun
at
that
person);
State
v.
Toczko,
23
Conn.
App.
502,
509,
582
A.2d
769
(1990).
A
police
officer
is
justified
in
using
deadly
physical
force
under
the
relevant
self-defense
statute,
§
53a-22,4
only
when
(1)
he
reasonably
believes
such
force
to
be
necessary
(2)
to
defend
himself
or a
third
person
from
the
use
or
imminent
use
of
deadly
physical
force.
The
‘‘subjective-objective,’’
test
is
used
in
evaluating
self-defense
claims
under
General
Statutes
§
53a-19.
See
State
v.
Prioleau,
235
Conn.
274,
286,
664
A.2d
743
(1995).
We
agree
that
the
reasonableness
of
the
defendant’s
belief
under
§
53a-22
should
be
evaluated
pursuant
to
the
subjective-objective
formulation.
Under
that
test,
the
jury
must
first
determine
whether,
on
the
basis
of
all
the
evidence,
the
defendant
in
fact
honestly
believed
that
deadly
force,
rather
than
some
lesser
degree
of
force,
was
necessary
to
repel
the
victim’s
alleged
attack.
See
id.
If
the
jury
determines
that
the
defendant
honestly
believed
that
deadly
force
was
necessary,
it
then
turns
to
the
second,
or
‘‘objective,’’
part
of
the
test.
Here,
the
jury’s
inquiry
requires
it
to
determine
whether
the
defendant’s
honest
belief
was
reasonable.5
See
id.,
287.
The
defendant
maintains
that
the
state
failed
to
introduce
sufficient
evidence
to
disprove
beyond
a
reasonable
doubt
the
elements
of
self-defense
as
set
forth
in §
53a-22.
‘‘Expert
testimony
should
be
admitted
when:
(1)
the
witness
has
a
special
skill
or
knowledge
directly
applicable
to a
matter
in
issue,
(2)
that
skill
or
knowledge
is
not
common
to
the
average
person,
and
(3)
the
testimony
would
be
helpful
to
the
court
or
jury
in
considering
the
issues.’’
State
v.
Billie,
250
Conn.
172,
180,
738
A.2d
586
(1999).
In
determining
whether
expert
testimony
on
the
use
of
force
by a
police
officer
is
properly
admissible
under
the
appropriate
standard,
we
note
that
‘‘[a]s
a
general
proposition,
the
‘objective
reasonableness’
standard
may
be
comprehensible
to a
lay
juror.
On
the
other
hand,
any
‘objective’
test
implies
the
existence
of a
standard
of
conduct,
and,
where
the
standard
is
not
defined
by
the
generic—a
reasonable
person—but
rather
by
the
specific—a
reasonable
officer—it
is
more
likely
that
[federal
rule
of
evidence]
702’s
line
between
common
and
specialized
knowledge
has
been
crossed.’’
Kopf
v.
Skyrm,
993
F.2d
374,
378
(4th
Cir.
1993)
(analyzing
plaintiff’s
claim
that
court
improperly
excluded
expert
testimony
concerning
defendant’s
use
of
nondeadly
force
in
effecting
arrest).
In
Kopf,
the
United
States
Court
of
Appeals
for
the
Fourth
Circuit
stated
that
‘‘[w]here
force
is
reduced
to
its
most
primitive
form—the
bare
hands—expert
testimony
might
not
be
helpful.
Add
handcuffs,
a
gun,
a
slapjack,
[M]ace,
or
some
other
tool,
and
the
jury
may
start
to
ask
itself:
what
is [M]ace?
what
is
an
officer’s
training
on
using
a
gun?
how
much
damage
can
a
slapjack
do?
Answering
these
questions
may
often
be
assisted
by
expert
testimony.’’
Id.,
379.
We
find
that
reasoning
persuasive
in
the
case
at
hand.
Two
statutes,
§§
53a-19
and
53a-22,
authorize
the
use
of
deadly
force
in
self-defense.
Section
53a-19,
the
civilian,
or
nonpeace
officer
self-defense
statute,
is
entitled
‘‘[u]se
of
physical
force
in
defense
of
person.’’
It
provides
in
relevant
part
for
the
use
of
deadly
force
in
self-defense,
with
several
relevant
exceptions
that
we
note,
as
follows:
‘‘[A]
person
is
justified
in
using
. .
.
deadly
physical
force
[only
if]
the
actor
reasonably
believes
that
such
other
person
is
(1)
using
or
about
to
use
deadly
physical
force,
or
(2)
inflicting
or
about
to
inflict
great
bodily
harm.’’
General
Statutes
§
53a-19
(a).
The
use
of
deadly
force
by
persons
other
than
peace
officers
is
specifically
proscribed
in
other
subsections
of §
53a-19.
Subsection
(b)
provides:
‘‘Notwithstanding
the
provisions
of
subsection
(a)
of
this
section,
a
person
is
not
justified
in
using
deadly
physical
force
upon
another
person
if
he
knows
that
he
can
avoid
the
necessity
of
using
such
force
with
complete
safety
(1)
by
retreating,
except
that
the
actor
shall
not
be
required
to
retreat
if
he
is
in
his
dwelling,
as
defined
in
section
53a-100,
or
place
of
work
and
was
not
the
initial
aggressor,
or
if
he
is a
peace
office
or a
private
person
assisting
such
peace
officer
at
his
direction,
and
acting
pursuant
to
section
53a-22,
or
(2)
by
urrendering
possession
of
property
to a
person
asserting
a
claim
of
right
thereto,
or
(3)
by
complying
with
a
demand
that
he
abstain
from
performing
an
act
which
he
is
not
obliged
to
perform.’’
Subsection
(c)
of §
53a-19
provides:
‘‘Notwithstanding
the
provisions
of
subsection
(a)
of
this
section,
a
person
is
not
justified
in
using
physical
force
when
(1)
with
intent
to
cause
physical
injury
or
death
to
another
person,
he
provokes
the
use
of
physical
force
by
such
other
person,
or
(2)
he
is
the
initial
aggressor,
except
that
his
use
of
physical
force
upon
another
person
under
such
circumstances
is
justifiable
if
he
withdraws
from
the
encounter
and
effectively
communicates
to
such
other
person
his
intent
to
do
so,
but
such
other
person
notwithstanding
continues
or
threatens
the
use
of
physical
force,
or
(3)
the
physical
force
involved
was
the
product
of a
combat
by
agreement
not
specifically
authorized
by
law.’’
Section
§
53a-22,
entitled
‘‘[u]se
of
physical
force
in
making
arrest
or
preventing
an
escape,’’
applies
to
peace
officers.
It
provides
in
relevant
part:
‘‘A
peace
officer
. .
. is
justified
in
using
deadly
physical
force
upon
another
person
[to
effectuate
an
arrest
or
to
prevent
an
escape,
or
to
defend
himself
or a
third
person
from
the
use
or
imminent
use
of
physical
force
while
doing
so]
only
when
he
reasonably
believes
such
to
be
necessary
to:
(1)
Defend
himself
or a
third
person
from
the
use
or
imminent
use
of
deadly
physical
force;
or
(2)
effect
an
arrest
or
prevent
the
escape
from
custody
of a
person
whom
he
reasonably
believes
has
committed
or
attempted
to
commit
a
felony
which
involved
the
infliction
or
threatened
infliction
of
serious
physical
injury
and
if,
where
feasible,
he
has
given
warning
of
his
intent
to
use
deadly
physical
force.’’
General
Statutes
§
53a-22
(c).
We
conclude
that
the
test
for
evaluating
self-defense
claims
pursuant
to §
53a-22
is a
subjective-objective
test.
The
jury
is
required,
first,
to
determine
whether
the
defendant
honestly
believed
that
the
use
of
deadly
force
was
necessary
in
the
circumstances.
If,
however,
the
jury
determines
that
the
defendant
in
fact
had
believed
that
the
use
of
deadly
force
was
necessary,
the
jury
must
make
a
further
determination
as
to
whether
that
belief
was
reasonable,
from
the
perspective
of a
reasonable
police
officer
in
the
defendant’s
circumstances.
See
Graham
v.
Connor,
490
U.S.
386,
396,
109
S.
Ct.
1865,
104
L.
Ed.
2d
443
(1989)
(evaluating
reasonableness
of
police
officer’s
belief
that
deadly
force
justified
in
context
of
fourth
amendment
excessive
use
of
force
claims,
stating
that
‘‘[t]he
[objective]
reasonableness
of a
particular
use
of
force
must
be
judged
from
the
perspective
of a
reasonable
officer
on
the
scene,
rather
than
with
the
20/20
vision
of
hindsight’’);
Weyel
v.
Catania,
52
Conn.
App.
292,
296,
728
A.2d
512
(all
claims
that
law
enforcement
officers
have
used
excessive
force
in
the
course
of
an
arrest,
whether
deadly
force
or
not,
should
be
analyzed
under
the
reasonableness
standard
of
the
fourth
amendment),
cert.
denied,
248
Conn.
922,
733
A.2d
846
(1999).12
Allard’s
testimony
regarding
the
training
that
the
defendant
received
on
the
use
of
deadly
force
was
relevant
to
the
defense.
It
did
not
invade
the
province
of
the
jury
on
the
ultimate
issue
of
fact.
Rather,
it
would
have
permitted
the
defendant
to
establish
his
defense
by
assisting
the
jury
in
evaluating
whether
his
beliefs
did
in
fact
comport
with
the
standard
of a
reasonable
peace
officer.
As
discussed
in
part
II,
the
test
for
determining
whether
a
police
officer’s
use
of
deadly
force
was
reasonable
is
to
be
judged
according
to
the
subjective/objective
formulation
used
in
evaluating
self-defense
claims
under
§
53a-19.
With
respect
to
the
objective
part
of
the
test,
however,
the
reasonableness
is
to
be
judged
from
the
perspective
of a
reasonable
police
officer.
FN4
General
Statutes
§
53a-22,
entitled
‘‘[u]se
of
physical
force
in
making
arrest
or
preventing
escape,’’
provides
in
relevant
part:
‘‘(a)
For
purposes
of
this
section,
a
reasonable
belief
that
a
person
has
committed
an
offense
means
a
reasonable
belief
in
facts
or
circumstances
which
if
true
would
in
law
constitute
an
offense.
If
the
believed
facts
or
circumstances
would
not
in
law
constitute
an
offense,
an
erroneous
though
not
unreasonable
belief
that
the
law
is
otherwise
does
not
render
justifiable
the
use
of
physical
force
to
make
an
arrest
or
to
prevent
an
escape
from
custody.
A
peace
officer
. .
.
who
is
effecting
an
arrest
pursuant
to a
warrant
or
preventing
an
escape
from
custody
is
justified
in
using
the
physical
force
prescribed
in
subsections
(b)
and
(c)
of
this
section
unless
such
warrant
is
invalid
and
is
known
by
such
officer
to
be
invalid.
‘‘(b)
Except
as
provided
in
subsection
(a)
of
this
section,
a
peace
officer
. .
. is
justified
in
using
physical
force
upon
another
person
when
and
to
the
extent
that
he
reasonably
believes
such
to
be
necessary
to:
(1)
Effect
an
arrest
or
prevent
the
escape
from
custody
of a
person
whom
he
reasonably
believes
to
have
committed
an
offense,
unless
he
knows
that
the
arrest
or
custody
is
unauthorized;
or
(2)
defend
himself
or a
third
person
from
the
use
or
imminent
use
of
physical
force
while
effecting
or
attempting
to
effect
an
arrest
or
while
preventing
or
attempting
to
prevent
an
escape.
‘‘(c)
A
peace
officer
. .
. is
justified
in
using
deadly
physical
force
upon
another
person
for
the
purposes
specified
in
subsection
(b)
of
this
section
only
when
he
reasonably
believes
such
to
be
necessary
to:
(1)
Defend
himself
or a
third
person
from
the
use
or
imminent
use
of
deadly
physical
force;
or
(2)
effect
an
arrest
or
prevent
the
escape
from
custody
of a
person
whom
he
reasonably
believes
has
committed
or
attempted
to
commit
a
felony
which
involved
the
infliction
or
threatened
infliction
of
serious
physical
injury
and
if,
where
feasible,
he
has
given
warning
of
his
intent
to
use
deadly
physical
force.
. .
.’’
FN5
The
objective
part
of
the
test
under
General
Statutes
§
53a-19
requires
the
jury
to
measure
the
defendant’s
honest
belief
against
the
standard
of a
reasonable
person
in
the
defendant’s
circumstances.
State
v.
Prioleau,
235
Conn.
287.
As
we
will
discuss,
we
agree
with
the
defendant
that
in
addressing
the
objective
part
of
the
test
under
General
Statutes
§
53a-22,
however,
the
standard
is
that
of a
reasonable
peace
officer.
As
we
will
discuss,
we
conclude
that
the
evidence
adduced
at
trial,
when
viewed
in a
light
most
favorable
to
sustaining
the
jury’s
verdict,
was
sufficient
to
disprove
the
elements
of §
53a-22
even
under
the
‘‘reasonable
peace
officer’’
standard.
We
note,
however,
that
at
the
new
trial,
the
defendant
may
introduce
additional
evidence
supporting
his
claim
that
he
was
justified
in
using
deadly
force
according
to
the
standard
articulated
in
this
opinion.
Accordingly,
we
express
no
opinion
as
to
whether
the
state’s
evidence
will
be
sufficient
to
disprove
the
defendant’s
justification
defense
at
that
time.
FN8
The
sixth
amendment
to
the
United
States
constitution
provides
in
relevant
part:
‘‘In
all
criminal
prosecutions,
the
accused
shall
enjoy
the
right
to a
speedy
and
public
trial,
by
an
impartial
jury
of
the
State
and
district
wherein
the
crime
shall
have
been
committed
. .
.
and
to
be
informed
of
the
nature
and
cause
of
the
accusation;
to
be
confronted
with
the
witnesses
against
him;
to
have
compulsory
process
for
obtaining
witnesses
in
his
favor,
and
to
have
the
assistance
of
counsel
for
his
defense.’’
FN9
The
constitution
of
Connecticut,
article
first,
§ 8,
provides
in
relevant
part:
‘‘In
all
criminal
prosecutions,
the
accused
shall
have
a
right
to
be
heard
by
himself
and
by
counsel;
to
be
informed
of
the
nature
and
cause
of
the
accusation;
to
be
confronted
by
the
witnesses
against
him;
to
have
compulsory
process
to
obtain
witnesses
in
his
behalf
. .
.
and
in
all
prosecutions
. .
. to
a
speedy,
public
trial
by
an
impartial
jury.
No
person
shall
be
compelled
to
give
evidence
against
himself,
nor
be
deprived
of
life,
liberty
or
property
without
due
process
of
law
. .
.
.’’
Additional
case
law
cites
from
author:
In
1984,
the
Connecticut
Supreme
Court
articulated
the
test
for
determining
the
degree
of
force
warranted
in a
given
case.
Whether
or
not
a
person
was
justified
in
using
force
to
protect
his
person
or
property
is a
question
of
fact
that
focuses
on
what
the
person
asserting
the
defense
reasonably
believed
under
the
circumstances
(State
v.
DeJesus,
194
Conn.
376,
389
(1984)).
The
test
for
the
degree
of
force
in
self-defense
is a
subjective-objective
one.
The
jury
must
view
the
situation
from
the
defendant's
perspective;
this
is
the
subjective
component.
The
jury
must
then
decide
whether
the
defendant's
belief
was
reasonable
(DeJesus
at
389
n.
13).
“…the
law
requires
that
the
officers
belief
needs
only
to
be
reasonable,
and
not
necessarily
correct…”
Jonathan
C. Benedict
State’s
Attorney
Judicial
District
of
Fairfield,
Connecticut November 21, 2006…
Source
:
C.G.S.
51-277a
http://www.ct.gov/csao/cwp/view.asp?A=1802&Q=328338
There is
no
“Magical
on/off
Switch”...Scott
v
Harris
...the law
requires
that the
officers
belief
needs
only to
be
reasonable,
and
not
necessarily
correct...Jonathan
C.
Benedict
-
State’s
Attorney
-
Judicial
District
of
Fairfield,
Connecticut
-
November
21, 2006
Editor's
Comment:
Check
your
"dimmer
switch"
during
training!
Not only
must the
officer's
belief
in the
type of
threat
facing
him/her have
been
reasonable,
but,
under
the
wording
of the
statute
(CGS
53a-22),
the
degree
of force
used in
response
must be
evaluated
for
reasonableness
as well.
Reginald
F.
Allard,
Jr.
13thjuror,
LLC
www.expertcop.com;
www.13thjuror.com
13thjuror@cox.net;
coplaw@13thjuror.com
