General Order (“G.O.”) § 1010.10, which reads in relevant
part as follows:
The Bureau
recognizes that members may be required to use deadly force when
their life or the
life of
another is jeopardized by the actions of others. Therefore, state
statute and Bureau policy provide for the use of deadly force under
the following circumstances:
a.
Members may use deadly force to protect themselves or others
from what
they
reasonably believe to be
an immediate threat of death or serious physical
injury.
b. A
member may use deadly force to effect the capture or prevent the
escape
of a
suspect where the member has
probable cause to
believe that the suspect
poses a significant
threat of death or serious physical injury to the member
or others.
c. If
feasible, some warning has been given.
Members
must be mindful of the risks inherent in employing deadly force.
A member’s
reckless or negligent use of
deadly force is not justified in this policy or State statute.
Members are to be aware that this directive is more restrictive
than state statutes. G.O. § 1010.10.
The Supreme Court has held that municipalities may
be held liable as “persons” under § 1983 “when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy,
inflicts the injury.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A plaintiff
may also establish municipal liability by demonstrating that (1) the
constitutional tort was the result of a “longstanding practice or
custom which constitutes the
standard operating procedure of the local government entity;”
(2) the tortfeasor was an official whose acts fairly represent
official policy such that the challenged action constituted official
policy; or (3) an official with final policy-making authority
“delegated that authority to, or
ratified the decision
of, a subordinate.” Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco,
308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002).
Price first contends that, as written, the City’s
official policy governing the use of lethal force by police officers
violates the Fourth Amendment’s requirements, as explicated by the
Supreme Court in
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Specifically,
Price argues that the City’s policy, expressed in G.O. § 1010.10,
that an officer “reasonably believe” a suspect poses an immediate
threat of serious physical injury or death falls short of the
“probable cause” requirement set forth in Garner and this
court’s precedents. 471 U.S. at 11-12; Brewer v. City of Napa,
210 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000) (referring to Garner’s
“probable cause” deadly force standard as a “more specific and
demanding standard” than Graham’s excessive force standard
for the use of nonlethal force ).
Price’s arguments about the application of the
City’s deadly force policy are not limited solely to the
interpretation of the policy. She also contends that the City has
failed adequately to
discipline officers for the inappropriate use of deadly force,
and has trained them in such
a fashion as to lead to the unjustified use of deadly force.
Price’s case depends largely upon the
Streed Declaration, which in
turn relies upon the purported difference between “reasonable
belief” and “objective probability”
discussed above. It is hard to know how much weight to give an
expert report that seems, as the district court noted, to
incorporate that assumption throughout its own analysis. In addition
to the Streed Declaration, however, other evidence in the record,
such as the PARC report, could support Price’s claims.
The district court was
unwilling to give the Streed Declaration sufficient weight to
survive summary judgment once it found error in the
legal distinction relied upon therein.
The “inadequacy of police training may serve as the
basis for § 1983 liability
only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference
to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
Under Harris and progeny, one must
demonstrate a “conscious” or “deliberate” choice on the part of a
municipality in order to prevail on a failure to train claim. See
Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir.
2007). Harris’s standard is objective in that it does permit
a fact finder to infer “constructive” notice of the risk where it
was “obvious”—but this is another way of saying that there needs to
be some evidence that tends to show a conscious choice. See
Farmer v.Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 841 (1994) (“It would be hard to describe the
Canton understanding of deliberate indifference, permitting
liability to be premised on obviousness or constructive notice, as
anything but objective.”).
Price next contends that the
City’s policy, as interpreted by statements made in depositions by
Chief Foxworth and the City’s legal arguments before the
district court, suffices to sustain a Monell claim based on a
“longstanding procedure,” even if the City’s policy as written is
constitutional. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 168 (1970); see also Ulrich, 308 F.3d at 984-85.
Price emphasizes the City’s concession in legal
arguments before the district court that “reasonable belief” was a
label for a standard “less specific and demanding” than “probable
cause.” As the discussion above has shown, the
City was tracking the
language of Brewer and similar cases, which, while admittedly
confusing in their references to the Garner and Graham framework,
did not actually distinguish between “reasonable belief” and
“probable cause” but between the circumstances justifying the use of
deadly force and those justifying the use of lesser force.
Price specifically notes that in depositions related
to this litigation, Chief Foxworth stated that he believed there was
a difference between “reasonable belief” and “probable cause.” In
the first instance, Chief Foxworth agreed with a question from an
attorney that “there’s some difference in the amount of confidence
that the officer needs to have before using deadly force for
self-defense . . . that that’s a slightly different standard than
the probable cause standard where someone is escaping?” But in the
same colloquy, when pressed as to whether a reasonable belief left
“room for difference of opinion,” Chief Foxworth replied, “no,
that’s why I think they’re pretty close.” Chief Foxworth’s
descriptions of the need to look at the circumstances, rather than
the subjective beliefs of the officer, are clear from the record.
That Chief Foxworth assumed there was some
difference between the two different phrases applying to two
different scenarios is nevertheless troubling, a point on which we
agree with our colleague in dissent. From the same deposition
testimony, Price points to a question which suggests that Chief
Foxworth thought the “reasonable belief” standard to be subjective.
The question and answer went as follows:
Q. All right. When we talk about subparagraph A,
when we talk about reasonable belief, I’ve read a lot of the
training material that the department has put out. And there’s
discussion about subjective reasonable belief and objective
reasonable belief, and I’m wondering what your understanding is of a
situation. And let’s just talk about self-defense rather than
defense of others. If a police officer is in a situation where he or
she personally, reasonably, honestly believes that they’re in a
self-defense situation and they’re facing the immediate threat of
death or immediate serious physical injury, is that sufficient to be
within subparagraph A, or does it have to be some objective, you
know, kind of imaginary objective officer who has the reasonable
belief?
A. It’s the first one that you’ve described.
This exchange between the lawyer and Chief Foxworth
is more ambiguous than Price suggests, since the question itself
includes both subjective and objective elements. The question
includes the term “reasonably” in the first scenario, and tracks the
language that “they’re facing the immediate threat of death or
immediate serious physical injury.” Thus, it is possible that Chief
Foxworth was not embracing a subjective standard at all.
We conclude
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
City’s interpretation of the differing phrases in G.O. § 1010.10(a)
and § 1010.10(b) represents the sort of “longstanding” custom or
practice that can establish Price’s Monell claim even though
the formal written policy does not.
...we are
unable to conclude that no rational trier of fact could agree with
Price’s interpretation of the City’s history of discipline and
training and its relevance to an allegedly unconstitutional
“longstanding” use of deadly force in situations where the
objective facts did not support such force.
FISHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part,
dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment:
...the
Portland Police Bureau’s (“PPB”) apparent misunderstanding of the
deadly force policy at issue here.
Officer Sery, who had approached the car from the
driver’s side, shot Perez through the open driver’s side window,
killing him
The officers testified that Perez had been resistant
when they asked him for identification and that when they tried to
physically subdue him he reached into his pocket and
began digging for something.
Officer Sery claims that he fired his gun only after Perez failed to
follow repeated commands to
show his hands and after it
appeared that Perez had
pulled something from his pocket. Several eyewitnesses told a
radically different story, in which the
officers approached Perez’s
car with guns drawn and Perez complied with the officers’
instructions. One eyewitness further testified that
Perez did not put his hands
in his pockets at all, and instead put his right hand in the air
while attempting to unbuckle his seatbelt with his left hand to
comply with the officers’ instructions to exit the car. It is
undisputed that Perez’s seatbelt was still buckled when he was shot
and that he was unarmed.
Police Chief
Foxworth indicated that he interpreted this policy to mean
that the “reasonable belief” required to shoot an attacking suspect
was a “less specific and
demanding” standard than the “probable cause” required to
shoot a fleeing suspect. He
understood probable cause to mean a level of confidence of
“more likely than not,” which others might “describe [ ]
as 51 percent versus 49 percent.” Although he thought
reasonable belief was “pretty close . . . if not the same,”
when asked if “there’s some difference in the amount of confidence
that the officer needs to have before using deadly force for
self-defense . . . that that’s a slightly different standard than
the probable cause standard where someone is escaping,” he responded
that “I believe that, yes, there is. I believe they’re close,
but I believe there is a difference.”
The crux of this case is what the
Fourth Amendment’s objective
reasonableness standard requires before an officer may resort
to deadly force.
First, is there a legal distinction under the
Fourth Amendment between the “probable cause” and “reasonably
believe” formulations? Second, insofar as the City and PPB
understood and applied the PPB Policy in practice, was there an
actual distinction between these formulations, one that
encouraged or tolerated police officers’ using deadly force when it
was objectively unreasonable to do so? I generally agree with the
majority’s conclusions that the policy as written can be construed
to be constitutional, but that in practice it might have been
understood to allow constitutionally impermissible uses of deadly
force.
I agree with the majority that an officer’s use of
deadly force is justified only if the totality of the circumstances
support an “objective[ly
reasonable] belief that an imminent threat of death or serious
physical harm” exists. Op. at 796. In Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Supreme Court formulated the objective
reasonableness standard in the deadly force context in terms of
probable cause,
holding that it
“may not be used . . . unless the officer has probable cause to
believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to
the officer or others.” Id. at 3. Since then,
we have often
distinguished the deadly force context by using the probable cause
formulation instead of the more general reasonableness standard
articulated for the non-deadly force context in Graham v. O’Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Typical of this distinction is Fikes v. Cleghorn,
47 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1995), which noted that: While the use of
“force” is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it would seem
justified to a reasonable police officer in light of the surrounding
circumstances, the use of “deadly force” is only justified if the
officer has probable cause to believe that a suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others. Id.
at 1014 n.2 (Leavy, J.) (citing Garner) (emphasis added);
see also Brewer v. City of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.
2000) (O’Scannlain, J.) (stating that “probable cause” is “a more
specific and demanding standard” than the more general
reasonableness standard applied in non-deadly force cases);2
Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido, 139 F.3d 659, 661
(9th Cir. 1996) (noting that “Garner established a special
rule concerning deadly force”), overruled on other grounds by
Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc);
Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 357 (9th Cir.
1996) (“Garner and Graham set forth somewhat different
standards for proving a Fourth Amendment excessive force violation.
The Garner standard . . . can apply only when deadly force
has been used.”)
I am troubled by the majority’s special emphasis on
the phrase: “all that matters is whether [the officer’s] actions
were reasonable.” By emphasizing this one passage, the majority
risks being read as incorrectly expanding the Court’s holding in
Scott, and removing from the reasonableness equation in deadly
force cases the
well-established requirement that the suspect must reasonably be
thought to pose a threat of death or serious injury.
We are satisfied that
our case law does
not support Price’s contention that “reasonable belief” is a lesser
standard than “probable cause” as a matter of law.
Both standards are
objective and turn upon the circumstances confronting the officer
rather than on the officer’s mere subjective beliefs or intentions,
however sincere. Our case law requires that a
reasonable officer under the circumstances believe herself or others
to face a threat of serious physical harm before using deadly force.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court clarified in Scott, the touchstone of
the inquiry is “reasonableness,” which does not admit of an
“easy-to-apply legal test.” 127 S. Ct. at 1777-78. The City’s policy
requires that an officer have a reasonable belief in an “immediate
threat of death or serious physical injury” and thus comports with
the requirement.
There can be no doubt that Scott was not
abandoning Garner’s prescription that a critical component of
the reasonableness standard in deadly force situations is whether
the officer has “an objective belief that an imminent threat of
death or serious physical harm” exists. Garner, 471 U.S.
at 3. Plainly, the “reasonableness” inquiry the Court envisions
continues to encompass the
well-established constitutional principle that resort to
deadly force is only justified “to prevent ‘serious physical harm,
either to the officer or others.’ ”
An officer must have a
sufficient basis
for and confidence in his or her belief that the suspect really does
pose a imminent threat of death or serious physical injury.
As the majority acknowledges,
it is not enough
that the officer idiosyncratically apprehends a threat to be real.
Op. at 796. Plainly, if an officer’s fears rest on the flimsiest of
grounds, then not even the sincerest conviction that only deadly
force can avert an otherwise inevitable calamity will justify its
use. The officer
must have a reasonable belief, not just a belief, in the existence
of that threat. Thus, we must be
clear that the
objective reasonableness analysis takes into account both the nature
of the perceived threat and the soundness of the officer’s basis for
making that assessment.
My concurrence is therefore directly conditioned on
the understanding that reasonable belief in the deadly force context
does not water down the degree of
reliability and
confidence that has been inherent in the traditional
probable cause formulation. See United States v. Gorman, 314
F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We now hold that the . . .
reasonable belief[ ] standard . . . embodies the same standard of
reasonableness inherent in probable cause.”). Only if the officer’s
beliefs are objectively reasonable can he or she be justified in
taking a life.
[P]robable cause[ ] is dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability. Both factors — quantity and quality — are considered in
the ‘totality of the circumstances, the whole picture’ that must be
taken into account . . . .Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330
(1990).
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, Maryland
v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), which stated that “[t]he
probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification into percentages because it deals with
probabilities,” is entirely consistent with my view. Id.
at 371 We do
not require officers to be absolutely sure that a threat of death or
serious physical injury is real before using deadly force. But we do
require that officers have an objectively reasonable basis for
believing that the threat is real. And in making that assessment, we
look to factors like the “quantity,” “quality,” “content” and
“reliability” of the information supporting the officer’s belief.
See White, 496 U.S. at 330.
Scott thus left unaltered the
bedrock principle
that the objective reasonableness standard requires us to examine
not only what an officer believes, but why he believes it. When the
“nature and quality” of the intrusion are “minimal[ ], . . .opposing
law enforcement interests” can support the intrusion “based on less
than probable cause.” See Place, 462 U.S. at 703. Conversely, when
the “nature and quality” of the intrusion are great, as when deadly
force is used, the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness
standard requires that the officer’s beliefs about the threat have a
firmer, more precise basis.
To sum up, the reasonable belief formulation of the
Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard in the context of
deadly force is no less stringent than the probable cause
formulation.
An officer may use deadly force only when the
circumstances support an
objectively reasonable belief that the suspect poses an imminent
threat of death or serious physical harm.
...where
“the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional
rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to
have been deliberately indifferent” to this need, then “the failure
to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy
for which the city is responsible.” City of Canton,
489 U.S. at 390.
Dr. Streed opined that the City’s training program
for the use of deadly force made it inevitable that police officers
would shoot unarmed persons. He specifically cited the City’s use of
a so-called “slumper” scenario in its training regimen, in which
officers encounter a sleeping suspect in a car who, upon being
awakened, immediately pulls out a hidden gun and fires at the
officer. He also noted that the officers are trained on a computer
simulation system in which suspects invariably attempt to kill the
officer being trained. Dr. Streed ultimately concluded that the
City’s training program
“create-[ed] a mindset for Portland officers that every citizen
encountered may have a gun, and there is nothing the police officer
can do to avoid being killed by a ‘bad guy’ unless the officer
shoots first.”
A reasonable jury could conclude on the basis of
this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Price, that the
City “disregarded a known or obvious consequence” of its training
practices. The Streed Declaration reasonably supports the inference
that, quite apart from the letter of the City’s deadly force policy,
officers were being instilled with a “shoot first” mindset that
foreseeably would result in unjustified applications of deadly
force. Cf. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.
In addition, a logical inference from
Chief Foxworth’s admission
— as the City’s highest ranking police officer and head of
the Portland Police Bureau — that he
erroneously thought that
reasonable belief embodied a lesser standard than probable cause
within the context of the City’s deadly force policy is that
the training of the police
force also reflected this mistaken understanding. A
reasonable jury could conclude training based on this misconception
constituted a failure to train. Therefore, I would permit Price also
to pursue that theory of liability on remand.
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Editor's Comment: The reader is encouraged
to provide this information to their agency's Legal Advisor for
clarification and understanding as it relates to their respective
Constitutional and Statutory law as filtered through their
respective agency Use of Force Policy.